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THE MANUFACTURER'S VIEW OF "NO-FAULT"
ROBERT MARTIN*

S HORTLY AFTER lift-off, a successful businessman and private
pilot lost power in his light twin engine plane and made an
emergency crash landing. The aircraft was a total loss but the pilot
walked away. He sustained painful back injuries, but he recovered.
As a pilot with considerable time and thoroughly familiar with
his aircraft, he concluded that after taking off he had subjected
the aircraft to maneuvers and attitudes which he should have
avoided because he knew he was almost out of fuel in both main
tanks. He consulted with his own lawyer, was advised of the applicable statute of limitations, and as he put it, "I was not interesetd
in suing anyone, and as far as I was concerned, the matter was then
laid to rest." Shortly after the accident the pilot purchased another
aircraft of the same make and model.
The hull carrier developed a more aggressive program. Suit
was filed against the airframe manufacturer for the subrogated
hull loss. When payment of the amount demanded was refused,
counsel for the hull carrier suggested that amended claims and
pleadings might be filed seeking recovery for personal injuries and
punitive damages unless the settlement demand was promptly met.
At this point, any claim by the pilot had been barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and, of course, the hull carrier was
a stranger to any such cause of action.
At about the same time demands were being pressed against
the manufacturer for payment of the hull loss, the pilot began to
receive telephone calls from a lawyer two thousands miles away
offering to represent him in a personal injury suit to be brought
against the manufacturer. The offer was declined several times.
* Mr. Martin is a senior partner at Martin, Pringle, Schell & Fair, Wichita,
Kansas. He is a past president of the Kansas Bar Association and a Fellow of
the American College of Trial Lawyers.
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Finally, the lawyer asked for a meeting and traveled two thousand
miles to see the "prospective client." He related that he and his
professional colleagues were experts in suits against this manufacturer and, indeed, had recovered verdicts in the millions of
dollars. When the statute of limitations point was raised, the lawyer assured the "prospective client" that there was really no problem; he had figured out a way to get around that. Statements were
made that the lawsuit would cost the plaintiff not one penny. Assured of a large recovery without risk or cost, the "client" finally
agreed to join in the venture on a contingent fee contract.
Suit was filed for more than ten million dollars in a jurisdiction
utterly unconnected with the crash or the personal or business
residence of the plaintiff. It was, however, directly connected with
the professional residence of the soliciting lawyer who proved to
be the same lawyer who had pressed demands for settlement of the
insured hull loss by threats of an action for personal injuries and
punitive damages.
The personal injury claimant was not told by the "solicitor"
that he had been representing the hull carrier. When suit was
filed the plaintiff was not favored with a copy of the complaint or
even notice of its filing. Furthermore, plaintiff had no idea that
claims for millions of dollars in punitive damages had been asserted in his name against the manufacturer. Discovery in the case
brought to light enough of these facts to cause the court to dismiss the action on the ground that the statute of limitations had run.
An airframe manufacturer offered, as optional equipment for
light aircraft, a landing gear safety device which automatically
lowered the gear when air speed and power settings were within
the regimen for approach to landing. A kit was developed and approved by FAA for installation in single engine aircraft. Adaptation of the device to an obviously more complex twin engine
aircraft was limited to factory installation.
A fixed base operator modified and supplemented the single
engine kit to install it on a twin engine aircraft. Later, the aircraft
went out of control and crashed with only the pilot aboard. The
wreckage and ground witness accounts tended to support the conclusion that the pilot lost control of the aircraft when the improperly installed landing gear safety device lowered the gear.
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Suit was instituted against the fixed base operator who sold and
installed the landing gear device with the manufacturer of the airplane joined as a co-defendant. The complaint, brought in the
name of the widow of the deceased owner and pilot of the aircraft,
claimed damages for wrongful death, loss of the aircraft, and punitive damages. The case was ultimately settled before trial. The
airplane manufacturer made only a token contribution, with the
fixed base operator and its carrier assuming the burden of the
settlement.
When the final order was entered in the case, it became clear
that, in large part, the litigation had been little more than a sham
-a series of maneuvers by the hull and workmen's compensation
carriers to adjust their losses and, hopefully, to compel a substantial contribution by the airframe manufacturer who was not involved with or responsible for the alleged malfunction of the geardown device. The widow and adult heirs of the deceased did not
receive one penny of the settlement proceeds. The use of the widow's
name as plaintiff in claims for wrongful death and punitive damages was apparently mere window-dressing, calculated to provide
local flavor and the emotional impact of sudden death.
The last document in the court file, an order approving the disbursement of the settlement proceeds, will fascinate critics of the
profession in any quarter. It recites that the adult heirs of the deceased are emancipated and self-supporting. The bereaved widow
and her minor son were found to have ". . . more than adequate
funds accruing to them from the proceeds of life insurance, workmen's compensation and a trust fund...." Clairvoyance is suggested by the finding that ". . . there is no likelihood of financial need
arising [to the widow or children] from these present circumstances."
Most intriguing, however, is a finding which justifies the payment of 100 percent of the settlement proceeds to insurance carriers because they prosecuted the lawsuit, which the court found
would have been "economically unfeasible" for the widow. At
this point the imagination of those who drafted the order seems to
have deserted them for the order contains no rationalization of
the widow's financial inability to pay costs of litigation with the
earlier conclusion that her resources and entitlements are so vast
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that she, her minor son and her other children would have no
present or future need for money.
Late one afternoon, a successful businessman holding a private,
multi-engine license, loaded his wife, two other couples and their
baggage in his firm's twin engine plane. After what must have been
the briefest of pre-flight preparation, he applied takeoff power at
the end of the runway. Shortly after lift off, the aircraft stalled and
crashed with the engines still developing takeoff power. All occupants were killed. The pilot had made an almost inconceivable
series of mistakes-tragic mistakes. The plane, with occupants,
baggage, and gasoline, was over its allowable gross weight for
flight and the load was distributed so as to place the center of
gravity aft of the center of gravity envelope. Disregarding written
checklists and at least two checks for freedom of controls before
take-off, the pilot took off with the aileron and elevator gust lock
pin in place in the control column. Overloaded, out of center of
gravity limits, with take-off power and controls locked, the aircraft, when it stalled, was utterly uncontrollable.!
Litigation was brought on behalf of all decedents against the
manufacturer, but neither the negligent pilot nor his employer,
assuming this was a business flight, were joined as defendants. In
fact, the estate and heirs of the pilot appeared as plaintiffs. The
theory of the case was that the manufacturer had improperly designed the control lock because it was possible for a man with
strong hands to remove the throttle hood, which held the throttle
levers in full retard position, to prevent starting of the engines
without disengaging the control lock pins. In short, it was contended that the manufacturer was responsible for the crash because it had not made it utterly impossible for the pilot to misuse
the control lock intentionally and to disregard checklists and standard pre-flight procedures.
As the case progressed the defense came into possession of secet written agreements negotiated between the insurance carrier
having exposure for the pilot's negligence and the estates of the
I Had the pilot shut down the power at any point in the takeoff roll or even
after lift off, but before the stall, the aircraft would have settled back on what
was about one-half mile of unused runway, probably without any injury to anyone aboard.
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decedents. In essence, these agreements guaranteed the claimants
that if they would prosecute litigation against other parties (to be
precise, the manufacturer, although the target defendant was not
named or described), the liability carrier would, in effect, guarantee a recovery of $100,000 per claim. Interesting variations of the
"guarantee agreement" concept were that the $100,000 was to be
a net recovery after expenses of litigation and attorneys' fees;
the guarantor advanced $50,000 which, of course, was then available to finance the litigation; and finally, the guarantor retained
effective control of the litigation by the device of requiring its
consent to any settlement.
It cannot be denied that the insurance carrier which was obligated
to respond for the pilot's negligence had acquired a contingent
interest in the outcome of litigation by other parties against the
manufacturer. If successful, the insurer escaped liability completely and even recovered its advances. The carrier was in a position
to control, or at least frustrate, a settlement at any figure which
could force a contribution by the guarantor. With guarantee agreements in hand, the carrier rejoiced and put the plaintiffs in touch
with counsel who promptly sued the manufacturer.
"No-fault" is a term commonly used to describe a device or system by which financial responsibility for casualty losses is assessed
without regard to causation or fault. From the standpoint of the
manufacturer, any debate on whether no fault should be applied
to aviation cases is largely academic. The incidents just described
are, in the last analysis, examples of no-fault:' no-fault by conspiracy and ambush.
Those who question these conclusions or wish to defend guarantee agreements and similar schemes and devices to promote
collusive or questionable litigation should take note of another
incident in the parade of horribles attending recent aviation cases.
These are by no means isolated symptoms; more have been discovered and

others will be. Insurers, especially members of underwriting groups and managed
pools, have met themselves coming and going in the "the jungle." In one instance,

managers and agents for a pool, in which some members of an underwriting
group participated, negotiated guarantee agreements which produced claims for
punitive damages and eventually a large verdict against a single defendant who
was insured by underwriters in the same group. To protect the appeal, under-

writers purchased a supersedeas bond for which a sizable premium was paid to
an affiliate of one of the companies that had guaranteed out with the plaintiff.
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A perceptive and courageous federal judge in a western jurisdiction, upon discovering the existence of guarantee agreements underlying litigation brought against a manufacturer, found that the
guarantee agreements "were made in bad faith for the purpose of
prosecuting a collusive suit and therefore constituted maintenance,
champerty, and barratry and are therefore contrary to public policy
and illegal." The parties to the guarantee agreements and their
agents were brought into the litigation and the agreements were
held null and void.
Philosophically, aircraft manufacturers are and should be opposed to no-fault in any form. They recognize that no-fault has been
applied, with poor results, in the automobile negligence sector and
that those plans are not applicable in principle or in practice to
aviation. The two areas have little in common except that both
involve vehicles designed for the transportation of human beings.
The manufacturers are also aware that the international treaties
(Warsaw and Guatemala, in force or proposed), do not provide
a solution for product liability exposure. Indeed, it can be reasoned
that at least the number of product claims would increase rather
than diminish under any presently known system of "no fault,"
with changes only in the identity of the plaintiff and, perhaps,
the forum for adjudication.
Historically, no-fault has always involved the laying on of the
strong hand of government. Inequities are imposed and perpetuated
in the cause of risk-spreading and social justice. Manufacturers are
no less repulsed than other responsible citizens and segments of
the social and economic community by the spectacle of a system
which protects the negligent from responsibility for injury to others
or requires the diligent and the careful to pay the freight for the
slovenly and the careless. Regardless of general attitudes and philosophical considerations, manufacturers surely recognize that for
causes presently to be discussed, they and the users of their products are the victims of no-fault by secret agreement as practiced in
aviation litigation. If forced to make a choice between extra-legal
no-fault and no-fault by legislative enactment, the manufacturers
would be foolish not to choose the latter. Imagination and careful
study may devise a legislative formula and an administrative structure for aviation no-fault which will avoid the shortcomings and
pitfalls of presently defined plans. Representative Milford is ob-
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viously struggling with just those problems. If he is successful, and
other conditions do not improve, there will be a market for his
product.
To remove any possibility that those who read or listen may
not get my message, it is this: in the United States today, the
bench, the bar, and the casualty insurance fraternity have countenanced or ignored conduct at ethical and moral levels which
have seriously undermined the wholesome concept of fault-oriented
responsibility for injury and even the adversary system itself.
Without effective reforms, initiated immediately, the legal profession and eventually the insurance fraternity will be forced to give
up their responsibilities in an increasing number of areas, and their
professional and business incomes, as they drop from the scene,
just as automobile personal injury litigation is now disappearing.
In my judgment, among the first of these areas will be aviation
casualty. Another may be medical malpractice. A further loss to
the profession may come in the form of severe restrictions on the
use of the class action device which has been subject to some similar abuses.
The symptoms cannot be ignored. The first reported judicial
involvement with guarantee agreements in the modem tradition
arose out of an automobile negligence case.' In the medical malpractice arena, guarantee agreements have been encountered and
denounced.'
In assessing the accuracy of the prediction that, absent prompt
reform, aviation cases will find their way out of the adversary system and the free insurance market, we should consider the following factors.
First, aviation cases have unusually high verdict potential. This
is especially true of general aviation cases since most often the
3

Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But see

Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973); Maule Ind., Inc. v. Rountree, 284
So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973); General Portland Land Dev. Co. v. Stevens, 291 So. 2d
250 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974). These cases indicate the courts of Florida are being

forced to reappraise their initial reaction to the "Mary Carter Agreement."
4
See Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971) where the court
stated:
We deem agreements whereby insurance carriers agree to pay any

consideration to foster litigation in which they are not interested,
in order to avoid their own liabilities, contrary to law and public
policy.

488 P.2d at 351.
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occupants of the airplane are in the high income groupings and
their survivors actually suffer and can demonstrate a large economic loss. Sudden death in an aircraft is also inflammatory. There
are those on every jury who are not accustomed to air travel.
They can become emotionally involved with vivid descriptions of
an airplane streaking down, out of control, with the occupants
alive and agonized at the prospect of certain death. Wrongful
death awards of a million dollars per seat are not unusual. This is
fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of questionable ethical conduct.
Secondly, regrettably, but almost always, the pilot and the occupants of the aircraft, who are in the best position to know what
actually happened, lose their lives in the crash. Ground witnesses
rarely supply any evidence bearing directly on the cause of the
crash, and only occasionally does evidence produced from radio
communications materially assist the inquiry for probable cause.
Aircraft casualty cases are tried almost entirely on the analysis
and testimony of experts of varying degrees of qualification. The
opportunities for perversion of fact or opinion, or both, are almost
limitless. By comparison, the ability of jurors and even judges to
test the credibility of the expert, the plausibility of his conclusions,
or even the facts or assumptions he has used is severely limited
because the judge and the jury lack formal training and experience
in the pertinent scientific disciplines. In theory, the layman's margin for error in scientific judgments should be offset by careful
adherence by the courts to sound rules of procedure and evidence
and by the impeccable ethics of the legal and scientific professions.
The system is in trouble simply because the conduct of some members of each group has fallen short of the mark.
Thirdly, the trial lawyer is the first indispensable part in the
machine of adversary justice. A good trial, like a good painting,
should be a miniature reproduction of a related segment of human
experience. For best results the trial lawyer must approach his task
with detached professionalism and a passion for presenting an
accurate picture of the truth as best he can perceive it. Professionalism of this caliber is frustrated by the unbridled use of contingent fee contracts which, in an aviation case, can generate fees
of hundreds of thousands and even millions of dollars, fees which
may bear little or no relationship to professional time, quality of
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service, devotion to professional ethics and the search for truth
and justice which are supposed to be the touchstones of the fault
and adversary systems. In cases which produce contingent fees of
such magnitude, lawyers can and do become the real party in
interest within the very essence of that concept.
Fourthly, the aviation defense bar cannot escape its share of responsibility for misconduct within the profession. The manipulation
of litigation against others through guarantee agreements and similar devices is often initiated by someone on the defense side of the
case, more often than not with the knowledge and probably the
active participation of counsel. No doubt, serious minded plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes cooperate reluctantly, in the mistaken belief that they are acting in the best interest of their clients. The
most disgusting single spectacle on the entire scene is the defense
lawyer who has secretly guaranteed a recovery to the plaintiff but
stays in the case. By subtle and deceptive moves and the cooperation of his client, who probably is called as a witness, the defense
lawyer casts his lot with the plaintiff for a high verdict in order to
insure that the award will be above the top limit of the guarantee,
a deceitful abuse of the adversary system.
Fifthly, some insurance carriers and their managers have become sponsors of the "no-limit, high stakes game" of aviation
casualty litigation. Many carriers who insure owners, pilots, and
fixed base operators are exposed on policies with inadequate limits of coverage supported by inadequate premiums. The manufacturers of airframes, engines, and components have become their
natural prey in a battle for the control of business. If the burden of
losses can be shifted to the manufacturer, they may continue to
dominate other sectors of the market with premium rates below
what they should be to sustain the risk. It is reasoned that the manufacturer has unlimited resources because it is a large industrial
concern and because the costs of product liability, whatever they
are, can be passed along to the consumers. It is one purpose of
this paper to suggest that events may prove this to be a very shortsighted view.
Sixthly, there are the second level victims of the practices described. They are the consumers: those who buy airplanes, pilot
them, or use them for business or pleasure as a passenger. The cost
in terms of price, quality, or availability of the airplane itself or
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its use will eventually reflect the consequences of what we are now
confronting. To be regretted even more, the safety, reliability,
and improvement of American airplanes will lag as the technical
staff of manufacturers and the FAA devote more and more of
their time to the defense of bloated and unjust claims and to minute criticisms of designs (sometimes 20 or 30 years old) by an
unfair comparison to the current state of the art, and as more and
more legislatures, acting under pressure from those who support
high stakes litigation, declare that improvements in the state of
the art and the product are admissible to prove defects in earlier
designs or articles. Like any malignancy, the system feeds on itself
and everything at hand: less progress means more litigation; more
litigation means less progress.
Lastly, if there is any enterprise in which the bench should
lead the bar, it should be in the discouragement of unseemly litigation. As stewards of a system for the pursuit of truth, judges
should condemn secret or oppressive agreements, whether they be
for guaranteed recovery or for extravagant counsel fees which
promote litigation. In most jurisdictions, courts have made little or
no effort to regulate contingent fees in wrongful death and personal injury litigation. For this failure, in part, those involved in
automobile negligence work are now paying a price. Unless controlled by the enforcement of carefully formulated ethical standards, the high award potential of aviation litigation, like medical
malpractice cases and class actions, represents an aggravated threat
to fault-orientied adversary systems of justice. It may not be true
that every man has his price, but it is true that a high price has its
takers. The professions are not an exception.
The potential for an extravagant verdict harbors oppression.
If the financial risk in a single case is high enough, defendants and
their insurers may be reluctant to spend present costs, which now
can approach a quarter-million dollars in scientific research, fees
of experts and lawyers, and months of formal discovery and trial,
even for a successful defense. The assertion of groundless claims
for punitive damages, now common practice in aviation litigation,
may divide the defendant and his insurers on issues of coverage.
Under these conditions, the nuisance value (settlement at or below the certain costs of defense) may be an attractive option even
at six figure levels, with the result that the evils of a system prosper.
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It is not unusual for aviation cases to be filed without any real
evidence, and perhaps no idea at all, of the cause of the crash. It
is sometimes the hope of plaintiff's counsel that in discovery he
will turn up some thread of a case from which a settlement demand
or a jury argument can be mounted.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support; ... For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
The pertinent parts of this rule have not changed since 1938. In
recent years, similar rules have been adopted by most state courts.
I have been unable to find a single case in which discipline under
this rule has been enforced or even threatened in a products liability
case or in litigation of any kind when excessive or unfounded
claims for actual or punitive damages have been made.' In fairness, it should be pointed out that defense lawyers have not been
disciplined for pleading matters in defense for which they can provide absolutely no support. Admittedly, the rule should be enforced
wisely and sparingly. Neither lawyers nor their clients should be
penalized for good faith allegations on which proof ultimately
fails or is insufficient. When, however, it has become a matter
of general knowledge within the profession, and indeed, a tactic,
to charge malice, wantonness, or fraud, and to claim punitive damages merely in the hope that such claims will induce settlement,
it is not reactionary to suggest that the bench has an obligation to
bring Rule 11 to the attention of the bar to insure that the halls
of justice do not take on the appearance of casinos in which the
odds are long and the stakes are high.
From the standpoint of the manufacturer, prospects for improvement in the products picture are dim. Figures collected by one
group in general aviation indicate that during the past ten years
the number of liability claims has increased by a factor of ten to
one. The costs of insuring, defending, and paying product liability
5 Only when facts documented in public records have been misrepresented by
a lawyer does it appear that Rule 11 has come into play. Nichols v. Alker, 126
F. Supp. 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); American Auto Ass'n v. Rothman, 101 F. Supp.
193 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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claims have increased at twenty to one. The total dollar amount of
claims asserted-the sum of all demands in all pending caseswould provide an interesting index of the present state of affairs.
Unfortunately, such figures are not available, but an educated
guess would place the number above one billion dollars. Although
the number, cost, and magnitude of claims and litigations is still
on the increase, it is significant that the sharpest increase occurred
in the five years 1967 through 1971. This time frame coincides
with the introduction of guarantee agreements and other devices
for conspiratorial no-fault into the arena of aviation litigation.
Even if the filing rate for new claims and litigation should level
off or decline, costs for insuring, defending, and paying claims
will obviously continue to increase for several years at unacceptable
rates. The size and risk of cases, the extensive use (sometimes
abuse) of discovery, and the time consumed in preparation and
trial in any case of serious proportions has become monumental.
It is usually a labor of years. The rate of disposition, including
settlements, cannot keep pace with the rate of filing and the extended case life, much less with the increase in total dollars
claimed!
Estimates of the efficiency of the fault-adversary system as it now
functions in the aviation casualty sector are difficult to make. Much
depends upon the selection of correct parameters for such variables
as time, investment in the system, and the cost of money. Most
calculations show that the aviation accident victims, their estates,
and heirs ultimately receive no more than fifteen percent to twenty
percent of the total amount spent in insuring, defending, and paying claims and litigation. No industry producing goods for sale
could tolerate this kind of inefficiency. The clients of lawyers, those
insured by underwriters, consumers of aviation products, and taxpayers who support our institutions of justice will not tolerate
such inefficiency when they find out why it exists, what it costs, and
who is picking up the tab.
Reform from within the profession, the bench, and the bar will
6 Aviation lawyers are now beginning to be afflicted with what has plagued
the automobile negligence bar for so long: polarization. In some cases, lawyers
waste time simply deviling each other and, when possible, the client. A professional group thus divided may find it almost impossible to work toward a solution of ethcial problems. This may be another sign of the direction in which
things are moving.
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probably be slow in coming for the basic evils-irresponsibility
and extravagance-have flourished in a long period of unprecedented growth and prosperity for the profession. There are, however, signs of the beginning of a turn-around: courts are beginning
to realize that guarantee agreements and their equivalent do not,
as originally supposed, promote settlements. They foster litigation.
Some courts have seen them for exactly what they are--examples
of champerty, maintenance, and barratry which are serious civil
wrongs and, in some jurisdictions, crimes."
The engagement of expert witnesses on contingent fee contracts,
although tolerated or ignored in many jurisdictions, has been condemned by a few courts which recently have begun to realize the
obvious: such arrangements have a tendency for the perversion of
justice and the encouragement of perjury.8
The best prospect for immediate and effective reform probably
rests with the insurance community. The aviation insurance fraternity, as compared to other segments of the industry, is thin in
numbers and not too unwieldly. A concerted effort by the dominant underwriters and pool managers to stamp out guarantee agreements, spurious subrogation claims, and sham party actions could
7

The court in Lum v. Stinnet, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971) stated:
Manifestly, in view of these considerations, the champertous agreement between respondent and the insurance carriers for Green and
Romeo called for improper conduct on the part of all attorneys
concerned; and while we recognize they became involved only out
of devotion to their clients, the agreement nonetheless contravened
policy expressed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, S.C.R. 153
et seq.
488 P.2d at 352.
See also Pinder v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, Docket No. C205-71, U.S.D.C.
Utah Cent. Div. (1973). The Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct has branded as unethical participation by defense counsel in
litigation when guarantee agreements actually align them with the plaintiffs.
8Western Cab. Co. v. Kellar, 523 P.2d 842 (Nev. 1974); Laos v. Soble, 18
Ariz. App. 502, 503 P.2d 978 (1973); Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. 508,
243 A.2d 150 (1968); Van Norden v. Metzer, 75 Cal. App. 2d 595, 171 P.2d
485 (1946), Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash. 290, 67 P.2d 868 (1937). See also
In re Imperatori, 152 App. Div. 86, 136 N.Y.S. 675 (1912) in which a lawyer
was suspended from practice for engaging a realtor to testify as an expert on
contingent fee. For cases approving engagement of experts to testify on contingent
fee, see Buckelew v. State, 48 Ala. App. 411, 265 So. 2d 195, cert. denied, 288
Ala. 735, 265 So. 2d 202 (1972); Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. King, 216
Ill. 416, 75 N.E. 166 (1905); Lack Malleable Iron Co. v. Graham, 147 Ky. 161,
143 S.W. 1016 (1912); Reed v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, 78 N.J.L. 549,
74 A. 447 (1909); and Potomac, F, & P.R. Co. v. Chichester, 111 Va. 152, 68
S.E. 404 (1910).
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significantly reduce the number and size of claims. I believe there
is a growing recognition among the better managed underwriting
groups and companies that the eradication of these practices is
essential to the growth and prosperity and, perhaps, the survival of
the industry. Some underwriters and companies have consistently
refrained from engaging in these practices; some have unwittingly
become involved. Hopefully, they will now bring pressure to bear
on less responsible members to adopt more acceptable standards of
conduct. A conscientious effort from the insurance community
could accelerate reform in the legal profession, for the fault-adversary system requires the participation of both.
There are presently two groups among the aviation manufacturers who have under study projects and alternatives designed to
bring some of the problem areas under control and to improve the
efficiency of the system to compensate those who suffer loss by
reason of an airplane crash. The concepts envision the participation
of insurers and underwriters within the market structures as they
exist today without resort to mandatory, government regulated nofault. While I am not at liberty to discuss the outlines or details
of these ideas, there is good cause to believe that they may contribute substantially to the solution of the problems under discussion,
perhaps in rather short order.
Air travel is still on the increase. The industry and its growth
rate have responded well to recession and fuel shortages. Critics
of the industry may claim otherwise, but the truth is that aircraft
manufacturers remain dedicated to research and product improvement for safety and reliability. The NTSB, FAA, groups of manufacturers, and manufacturers individually have vast amounts of data
under study and work in progress to determine the cause of crashes
and how they may be avoided. These efforts will contribute their
share to the eventual solution of current problems.
The real question, I submit, is whether those dedicated to the
preservation of the fault-oriented adversary system can clean it
up in time to avoid the imposition of a government enforced, mandatory no-fault program for compensation of aviation casualty
losses. The federal government already dominates almost every
aspect of air transportation. No delay can be counted on while the
advocates of expanding government solicit the cooperation of
state legislatures; the "Feds" can do it all. It is later than you think!

